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Determinants of diagnostic and pseudodiagnostic
information selection
MARKELLOS TSIOUPRAS1
FRÉDÉRIC VALLÉE-TOURANGEAU2
PANAGIOTIS KORDOUTIS3
Pseudodiagnosticity refers to the tendency to select impoverished information in
preference to equally available diagnostic data. Mynatt, Doherty, and Dragan
(1993) reported that pseudodiagnostic reasoning was attenuated in problems in
which the information selection had consequences for the reasoner’s future actions in contrast to problems
in which it did not. Girotto, Evans and Legrenzi (1996) denied that such “action” problems fostered better
information selection because they argued that in Mynatt’s et al.’s study action and non-action or inference
varied in how the decision task was framed. It was predicted that for action problems there will be a higher
frequency in informative data selection vs. both inference problems. In addition to that, a primacy effect for
inference problems would occur irrespective of sequence of data presentation but not for action problems.
We re-examined the way people reasoned about action problems and inference problems taking into
consideration Girotto et al.’s criticisms. We found that even when the presentation and salience of the
information was equated in both kinds of problems, diagnostic information selection was more likely for
action that for inference problems.
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1. Introduction
In certain hypothesis testing situations, data
must be gathered to adjudicate between two
hypotheses. The diagnosticity of the data is
indexed by the ratio of its probability given a
target hypothesis over its probability and given
an alternative hypothesis (or the likelihood ratio
of Bayes's theorem). It has often been observed
that when people are required to gauge the truth
of two hypotheses they select information in a
pseudodiagnostic manner (Beyth-Marom &
Fischhoff, 1983. Doherty et al., 1979. Doherty et
al., 1981. Ofir, 1988); that is, they select data in
a way that does not permit the construction of
the likelihood ratio. In addition, other studies that
investigated individuals on selection and
interpretation of information in a subtype 
of pseudodiagnosticity task found that when
participants would consider the consequence of
an action the rarity effect would weaken (Feeney,
Evans and Venn, 2008) Thus, instead of
choosing two proportions such as p(D | H) and
p(D | -H), they choose p(D1 | H) and p(D2 | H).
For example, in Doherty et al.'s (1979) study
subjects had to determine whether archae-
ological artifacts came from one of two locations.
These objects were described in terms of binary
characteristics (e.g., a pot had a curved handle
or not) and subjects had to choose among a set
of four proportions a pair of conditional
probabilities that could yield the most infor-
mation as to the origin of the artifact. Where D1
and D2 refer to a binary feature and H1 and H2
to the two locations, the four proportions were
p(D1 | H1), p(D2 | H1), p(D1 | H2), and p(D2 | H2).
The only appropriate strategy in such a task is to
select either p(D1 | H1) and p(D1 | H2) or either
p(D2 | H1) and p(D2 | H2), that is, a pair of
probability that unambiguously establishes the
diagnosticity of a feature. However, the majority
of subjects chose non-complementary pairs of
proportions, such as p(D1 | H1) and p(D2 | H1),
pairs that cannot gauge the diagnosticity of the
data selected.
Mynatt, Doherty, and Dragan (1993,
Experiment 1) replicated this pattern of
information selection with the following problem:
Your sister has a car she bought a couple
of years ago. It's either a car X or a car Y.
but you can't remember which. You do
remember that her car does over 25 miles
per gallon and has not had any major
mechanical problems in the two years
she's owned it. You have the following
piece of information:
1. 65% of car Xs do over 25 miles per
gallon. 
Three additional pieces of information are
also available:
2. The percentage of car Ys that do over
25 miles per gallon.
3. The percentage of car Xs that have
had no major mechanical problems
for the first two years of ownership.
4. The percentage of car Ys that have
had no major mechanical problems
for the first two years of ownership.
Assuming you could find out only one of
these three pieces of information, which
would you want in order to help you
decide what car your sister owns?
Based on Wason’s selection task it was
surmised that, individuals are more likely to
choose a non-complementary option in order to
predict or act upon the consequences of a given
problem. In Wason’s task, four cards were
provided to participants containing a number and
a letter on each side. The hypothesis was that if
there is a vowel (A) on one side then an even
number (2) would be on the other. Subsequently,
the participants would have to choose the card
that would determine whether the given
hypothesis is true or false (card A, K, 2 or 7). It
was concluded that human beings are more likely
to engage in the rarity assumption. Option A is
the valid option based on Popper’s (1954)
method falsification and Wason’s selection task
(1966, 1968). For the reason that, by choosing
any other option except A would not predict that
A is or is not equal to an even number (Oaksford
& Chater, 1994). Thus, the best selection is
choice (2) since knowing the percentage of car Ys
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that do over 25 miles per gallon would determine
the diagnosticity of the given piece of information
provided in the first paragraph. Yet 74% of the
subjects did not make that choice. 
Mynatt et al. (1993) sought to draw a
distinction between the problem above, which
they termed as an inference problem and a
problem where the information selection is done
to promote one of two actions, which will be
thoroughly explained in the proceeding
paragraph. They gave the following problem to
their subjects (Experiment 1): 
“You’re thinking of buying a car. You’ve
narrowed it down to either car X or car Y.
Two of the things you are concerned
about are petrol consumption and
mechanical reliability. You have the
following piece of information:
1. 65% of car Xs do over 25 miles per
gallon…” (…the rest of the problem
was the same as the one cited
above). 
With this version of the problem, 51% of the
participants chose option (2), the normative
selection, which allows constructing the likelihood
ration for petrol consumption. Mynatt et al.
explained the difference between the two types of
selection in terms of the focus of attention: the
focus of attention for an inference is on a solution
extrinsic to the reasoner and “the goal of the
problem solver is being correct… to a state of the
world” (p. 765). In turn, the focus of attention for
an action is intrinsic, a dimension of utility, and
“the available information is not a means to an
end, but is itself a direct representation of an end”
(p. 765). A simpler contrast may be drawn in
terms of utilities. In an action problem the
reasoner is invited to assume the choice as if it
were his own, and hence the cost of a wrong
decision and the benefits of a better one are
naturally made more salient which in turn might
make the logic behind the construction of
likelihood ratio more compelling. On the other
hand inference problems do not empower the
reasoners from that personalised perspective. 
In contrast, Girotto, Evans, and Legrenzi (1996)
offered evidence suggesting that the difference
between action and inference problems is a
procedural artefact. Legrenzi, Girotto, and Johnson-
Laird (1993) interpreted pseudodiagnosticity as a
form of focusing on explicit information: “one major
determinant of what is explicit in mental models is
the verbal description of a problem” (p. 59). Girotto
et al. (1996) based on Legrenzi et al. (1993) argued
that action problems produced different data
selections because they were framed differently.
They suggested that in the inference problem
readers “form a concrete mental model of the car in
question” (p. 11) and given a piece of information
for car X (petrol consumption) it is more likely to
choose information for mechanical reliability for the
same car X (focus on one object). On the other
hand, for the action version the preamble does not
focus on the car as such but rather provides
information for two dimensions (viz., “Two of the
things you are concerned about are petrol
consumption and mechanical reliability”). At the
very least, the preambles for action and inference
problems should be equated before on may
conclude that action problems foster more
diagnostic reasoning than inference problems. 
Girotto et al. (1996, Exp. 1) used the same
inference and action problems used in Mynatt et
al. (1993, Experiment 1) and also constructed
new versions of these problems with a modified
preamble. The preamble for the new inference
problem emphasised the relevance of the two
dimensions; it read as follows,
“Your sister has a car she bought a
couple of years ago. It’s either a car X or
a car Y, but you can’t remember which.
You do remember that two of the things
your sister is concerned about are petrol
consumption and mechanical reliability
…” 
In turn, the preamble for the new action
problem focused on the car read as follows,
“You are thinking to buy a car. You have
narrowed it down to either car X or car Y.
You have still to decide but you do want
your car to do more than 25 miles per
gallon and to have no major mechanical
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problems in the first two years that you
will own it…”
[The rest of the problems was the
same as in Mynatt et al. (1993, Exp. 1)]. 
For the problems taken from Mynatt et al.
(1993, Exp. 1), the pattern of information selection
replicated the earlier findings, namely the action
problem encouraged more diagnostic information
selection than the inference problem. However,
the results were reversed with the new problems:
the inference problem led to a more frequent
selection of diagnostic information than the new
action problem. These results suggest that
diagnostic information selection is very sensitive
to the way in which the problem is framed.
Mynatt et al. (1993) were well aware that
framing was important: their second experiment
showed no difference between action and
inference problems with a subtle modification to
the preamble. In the preceding experiment
subjects were told that “35% of car Xs do over 25
miles per gallon”. The difference in base rate from
65% in Experiment 1 to 35% in Experiment 2
shifted people’s attention to the alternative
hypothesis. That is, when p(D1 | H1) = 0.35 people
should believe that H1 is relatively unlikely to be
true and considered the alternative hypothesis,
and selected the same datum for both hypotheses
for both action and inference problems. 
Girotto et al. (1996, Exp. 4) proceeded further.
They proposed that changing the anchor “less or
greater than 0.5” (as Mynatt et al., 1993
suggested) for p(D1 | H1) is enough to produce
different information selection. Therefore,
defocusing participants by not providing any
anchor (65% or 35% of car Xs) would yield a low
rate of pseudodiagnostic information selection.
They gave the same preamble as in the original
inference problem (Mynatt et al., 1993, Exp. 1)
and the rest of it read as follows: 
“You have the following piece of
information: 
1. The percentage of car Xs that do over
25 miles per gallon.
2. The percentage of car Ys that do over
25 miles per gallon.
3. The percentage of car Xs that have
had no major mechanical problems
for the first two years of ownership.
4. The percentage of car Ys that have
had no major mechanical problems
for the first two years of ownership.
Assuming you could find out only two of
these four pieces of information, which
would you want in order to help you
decide what car your sister owns?”
In this version the informative dyads are (1, 2)
and (3, 4) the dyads that involve the selection of
the same datum (either 25 mpg or mechanical
reliability) for both alternatives (either car X or car
Y). Informative dyads were selected more
frequently (58%) than pseudodiagnostic dyads.
Girotto et al. (1996) concluded that the action-
inference distinction was not useful and that
defocusing people’s attention on one of the two
dimensions was sufficient to reduce
pseudodiagnostic information selection.
However, careful inspection of their data
reveals that 51% of their participants chose the
dyad (1, 2) and only 7% chose the dyad (3, 4)
suggesting a strong primacy effect. Girotto et al.
did not counterbalance the order of the four
options. Hence, their results might themselves
be a procedural artefact. In addition, Girotto et
al., did not design a direct comparison between
action and inference problem when no anchor or
focal hypothesis were given. The present study
sought to remedy these methodological
shortcomings in the following experimental
design. The possible order effect was
investigated with two inference problems
formulated in a manner identical with Girotto et
al.’s (1996, Exp. 4) problem but each with a
different order of features, either (D1X, D1Y, D2X,
D2Y) as in Girotto et al., or either (D1X, D2X, D1Y,
D2Y), where D1 refers to one of the two
dimensions (viz. miles per gallon and
mechanical problems) and the second subscript
to car X or Y.
A third problem was an action problem
formulated in the same way as the inference
problem (i.e. no anchor, focal hypothesis, or cue
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in the preamble) with the features ordered either
(D1X,D1Y,D2X, D2Y). Subject’s selection preferences
for this problem provided the much needed
control condition absent in Girotto et al.’s design
for their Experiment 4.
One fourth and final problem was an action
problem with an extended preamble with the
features ordered (D1X, D2X, D1Y, D2Y). As noted
above the framing of the problem is important. An
extensive preamble may encourage people to be
more alert and shift their attention to both
alternatives.
2. Method
Participants
The subjects were 200 undergraduates, 120
women (Mage= 34) and 80 men (Mage= 30), at
Hertfordshire University naive to the purpose of
the experiment. The participants were selected as
part of their requirements in an introductory
psychology course, 50 participants were
randomly assigned to each problem and were
individually tested, and demographic information
was not requested because most studies suggest
that it does not influence the process of the
selection task in decision making. 
Design and Procedure
Each subject was given a single sheet of
paper containing one of the four problems; two of
them were inference problems and two were
action problems. The inference X Y problem
(identical to Girotto et al.’s problem, 1996, Exp. 4)
read as follows:
Your sister has a car she bought a couple
of years ago. It’s either a car X or a car Y,
but you can’t remember which. You do
remember that her car does over 25 miles
per gallon and has not had any major
mechanical problems in the two years
she’s owned it.
For the first inference problem, labelled
Inference XY, the four pieces of information were
presented in the order (D1x, D1Y, D2X, D2Y) namely 
1. The percentage of car Xs that do over
25 miles per gallon.
2. The percentage of car Ys that do over
25 miles per gallon.
3. The percentage of car Xs that have
had no major mechanical problems
for the first two years of ownership.
4. The percentage of car Ys that have
had no major mechanical problems
for the first two years of ownership.
Assuming you could find out only two of
these four pieces of information, which
would you want in order to help you
decide what car your sister owns?
In the second inference problem, labelled
Inference XX, the preamble was identical but the
four pieces of information was presented in the
order (D1x, D2X, D1Y, D2Y) namely,
1. The percentage of car Xs that do over
25 miles per gallon.
2. The percentage of car Xs that have
had no major mechanical problems
for the first two years of ownership.
3. The percentage of car Ys that do over
25 miles per gallon.
4. The percentage of car Ys that have
had no major mechanical problems
for the first two years of ownership.
In the first action problem, labelled Action XY,
the preamble was phrased as follows:
You’re thinking of buying a car. You’ve
narrowed it down to either car X or car Y.
You have still to decide but you do want
you car to do more than 25 miles per
gallon and to have no major mechanical
problems in the first two years that you
will own it…(the rest of the problem and
the order of presentation of the four
pieces of information was the same as in
problem Inference XY).
In the second action problem with the
extended preamble, labelled Action (EP) XX
problem the preamble read as follows:
Imagine that you are a mechanical
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engineer and you work for a company.
This company is of the most prestigious
ones. All your life you were hoping to get
work there. After two years of hard work
you have been promoted to manager.
You are now responsible for production.
Two projects for a car X and a car Y are
presented to you by the research team.
You know that this is your opportunity.
The right choice will lead you straight to
the top as head of the department. You
will double your salary and you will have a
lot of power. The wrong decision may
jeopardise your current position.
You have three days before you present
your idea to the Chief Executive. The
research team provided you information
concerning petrol consumption and
mechanical reliability for car X and car Y. In
order to do the presentation you have the
following piece of information… (The rest of
the problem and the order of presentation of
the four pieces of information was the same
as in the Inference XX problem).
Participants were run in groups of 45 to 55,
but they worked on the problems individually.
They randomly received one of the four possible
problems. General instructions indicated that
answers were anonymous and the experiment
had to do with decision making and was not an
intelligence test. Participants were instructed to
feel free to choose any two pieces of information.
There are 6 possible ways of choosing two of
the four pieces of information: (a) 1 and 2 (b) 1
and 3, (c) 1 and 4, (d) 2 and 3, (e) 2 and 4, and (f)
3 and 4. Given the order in which the four pieces
of information was presented in problems Action
(EP) XX and Inference XX choosing dyads (b) or
(e) would be an informative data selection since
they specify the diagnÔsticity of one feature or the
other. Given the different order of presentation for
problems Action XY and Inference XY, dyads (a)
or (f) provide the diagnostic information. Table 1
summarizes the diagnostic value of each dyad for
the four kinds of problems.
3. Results
The frequencies of dyad selection for all four
problems are reported in Table 2. To facilitate the
description of our data these selection frequencies
were reclassified in three different ways. The first
was in terms of diagnostic and pseudodiagnostic
dyad selection frequencies (top portion of table 3).
The second was in terms of whether the first piece
of information in the selected dyad was actually
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Table 1
Diagnostic value of the six different dyads.
Note: mpg=miles per gallon; m. reliab.=mechanical reliability
Action(Ex) X X Action X Y
Inference X X Inference X Y
Diagnostic Pseudo- Diagnostic Pseudo-
Diagnostic Diagnostic
1 X car mpg (b) 1, 3 (a) 1, 2 X car mpg (a) 1, 2 (b) 1, 3 
2 X car m. reliab. (e) 2, 4 (c) 1, 4 Y car mpg (f) 3, 4 © 1, 4 
3 Y car mpg (d) 2, 3 X car m. reliab. (d) 2, 3 
4 Y car m. reliab. (f) 3, 4 Y car m. reliab. (e) 2, 4 
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the first piece of information encountered [dyads
(a)-(c)] or not [dyads (d)-(f); middle portion of
Table 3]. These frequencies revealed whether
subject’s selection reflected a primacy effect. The
third way reclassified only the diagnostic dyad
selection frequencies: The bottom portion of Table
3 reports the selection frequencies of the
diagnostic dyad about petrol consumption and
about mechanical reliability. Given the fact that
alternative hypothesis is tested and contains three
or more independent samples a new method was
utilized in order to considerably simplify
convention results. This cannot be possible in
other many-sample cases with a range of
expected patterns of ordering of sample rank
means. The formula for the Rank Sum Analysis is
presented on the appendix (see Table 4). The
advantages of a chapter for independent samples
are one of computational convenience because
multiple block techniques for unequal size are
quite importune. K x Q contrast frequency tables
differ from traditional chi-square (homogeneity)
which do not require ordered categories. Rank
Sum Analysis procedures are superior to chi-
square homogeneity. This is because; the order of
information is always presented in Rank Sum
Analysis Test. In addition, Rank Sum Tests can be
evaluated in terms of trends and contrasts, which
is not possible for homogeneity tests. The
complexity and the number of tests were kept to
the minimum. Parametric analysis is likely to raise
questions about the nature of the data.
Consequently, a non-parametric analysis was
preferred, in order to minimise the number of chi-
square ¯2, (see Meddis, 1984). We used a
rejection criterion of 0.01 unless indicated
otherwise.
Dyad Diagnosticity
As revealed in the top portion of Table 3,
participants in both action problems chose
diagnostic dyads in exactly the same proportion
(33/50 or 66%). The inference problems fostered
considerably fewer diagnostic dyad selections:
Participants selected 22 diagnostic dyads in the
inference XY problem (or 44%) and 14 diagnostic
dyads in the Inference XY problem (or 28%). A
rank sum analysis for contrast frequency tables
showed that the dyad selection frequencies for
the Action XY problem were significantly different
than the selection frequencies in the Inference
Diagnostic and pseudodiagnostic reasoning  31
Table 2.
Frequency of dyads selection.
Dyads Action(EP) XX Inference XX Action XY Inference XY
(a) 1,2 4 8 7 12
(b) 1,3 11 14 13 17
© 1,4 6 16 1 13
(d) 2,3 5 1 0 1
(e) 2,4 22 8 3 5
(f) 3,4 2 3 26 2
Total 50 50 50 50
Diagnostic Dyads are in bold and framed.
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problems XX and XY, z = 5.18. The comparison
between the Action (EP) XX and two inference
problems yielded the same significant z value.
Achi-square4 test contrasting the selection
frequencies in Inference XX and Inference XY
problems was not significant [¯2 (1) = 2.78, p=
0.096].
Primacy Effect
Participants chose dyads 1-3 for both action
problems less often (42%) than for Inference XX
and XY problems (76%) and (84%) respectively.
A rank sum analysis for contrast frequency
tables indicated that subjects in the Action XY
compared to those assigned either Inference
problems, selected significantly less often a
dyad involving the first piece of information, z =
11.29 (the same z value was produced when
contrasting the frequencies with the Action (EP)
XX problem with those of the two inference
problems). The selection frequencies in the two
inference problems did not differ significantly
[¯2 (1) = 1, p= 0.318].
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4. Footnote : In this analysis although two cells (both informative or non-informative) can vary there is only one
degree of freedom. In this case the ¯2 is interpreted as the proportion of informative/non-informative dyads in one
condition vs. the other condition (for an example see Everitt, 1977).
Table 3
Selection frequencies classified in terms of diagnosticity (top third), primacy (middle third)
and in terms of dimensions (bottom third).
Selection of diagnostic and pseudodiagnostic dyads
Dyads Action(EP) XX % Infer. XX % Action XY % Infer. XY %
Diagnost. 33 66% 22 44% 33 66% 14 28%
Pseudo- 17 34% 28 56% 17 34% 36 72%
Diagnost.
Total 50 100% 50 100% 50 100% 50 100%
Selection of dyads (a)-(c) and (d)-(f)
(a) – (c) 21 42% 38 76% 21 42% 42 84%
(d) – (f) 29 58% 12 24% 29 58% 8 16%
Total 50 100% 50 100% 50 100% 50 100%
Selection of diagnostic dyads for miles per gallon (mpg)
Or for mechanical reliability (M.Rel.)
Mpg. 11 33% 14 64% 7 21% 12 86%
M. Rel. 22 67% 8 36% 26 79% 2 14%
Total 33 100% 22 100% 33 100% 14 100%
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Diagnostic Dyad Type 
Diagnostic dyads could involve information
about petrol consumption for car X and Y or
about their mechanical reliability. The bottom
portion of Table 3 shows the frequencies with
which these two types of diagnostic dyads were
selected in the four problems. When assigned an
action problem, participant’s diagnostic dyad
selection was predominantly in terms of
mechanical reliability (67% in the Action (EP) XX
problem and 79% in the Action XY problem) while
inference problems fostered a diagnostic dyad
selection in terms of petrol consumption (64% in
the Inference XX problem and 86% in the
Inference XY problem). A rank sum analysis for
contrast frequency tables confirmed that
participants in the Action XY and Action (EP) XX
problems chose the diagnostic dyad focused on
petrol consumption significantly more often than
participants assigned one of the two inference
problems, z = 2.8, and z = 3.67, respectively.
The selection frequencies within both action
problems did not differ significantly [¯2 (1) =1.22,
p= 0.27] nor did they within both inference
problems [¯2 (1) = 2.08, p= 0.15]
5. Discussion
As Mynatt et al. (1993) had observed, reasoners
assigned to action problems were less likely to
select pseudodiagnostic information than reasoners
assigned to inference problems. Furthermore, the
results were identical for both action problems even
though the preamble and the sequence of the data
were different. In our study, the fact that inference
problems fostered pseudodiagnostic data selection
cannot be attributed to the framing of the problem,
to any anchor, focal hypothesis, or any cue in the
preamble to focus people’s attention on one or both
alternatives.
Reasoners assigned to an inference problem
also appeared more impatient in the consideration
of the evidence as illustrated by their overwhelming
tendency to select a dyad involving the first piece
of information they came across (on average 80%
of the time over Inference XX and XY problems). In
contrast (42% p<0.01) of the selected dyads with
the action problems involved the first piece of
evidence. This strong order effect with inference
problems explains why with such problems the
diagnostic reasoners appeared to favour to
contrast the cars along the petrol consumption
dimension: data about petrol consumption were
presented first (Girotto et al., 1996).
These results contradict Girotto et al.’s (1996)
findings who argued that there was no difference
between action and inference problems. We
suggested that their analysis unfairly compared
action and inference problems. First, in their
(1996) study there was no direct comparison
between action and inference conditions when no
anchor, focal hypothesis, or cue in the preamble
were provided to focus people’s attention on one
or both alternatives. Rather their comparison was
between a problem like our Inference XY (Girotto
et al., 1996, Exp. 4) and Inference XY problem in
Mynatt et al.’s study, when an anchor and a focal
hypothesis were given (1993, Exp. 1). Second, in
their study (Exp. 4) participants chose diagnostic
dyads 58% of the time but the four pieces of
information were ordered D1X, D1Y, D2X, D2Y. An
impatient reasoner selecting the first two pieces of
information for the sake of expediency would
actually be counted as a diagnostic reasoner. The
results of our own study suggest that reasoners
assigned an inference problem selected a dyad
involving the first piece of information. Thus the
lack of an appropriate action control problem and
the strong primacy effect in their data vitiate their
conclusion.
Mynatt et al. (1993) claimed that action
problems encouraged a more thorough
examination of the evidence because “utilities
are intrinsically tied to actions but are extrinsic to
inferences” (p. 773). Action problems may
foreground consequences of the selection and a
Bayesian reasoning problem is transformed into
a decision making one where reasoners’ choices
reflect their appreciation of the costs and
benefits of their decisions. Judging by the fact
that diagnostic dyad selection in action
problems predominantly involved information
about mechanical reliability it seems that
subjects most easily resonated to the cost and
Diagnostic and pseudodiagnostic reasoning  33
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Table 4
Formulas for Rank Sum Analysis and K x Q frequency table test.
I. Category totals (tq) and cumulative category totals (™tq) if coefficient that reflect hypothesis
are Ïj 1 2 3 then
tqA= 1A + 2A + 3A
™tqA= 1A + 2A + 3A
tqB= 1B + 2B + 3B
™tqB= 1B + 2B + 3B ™tqA
tqC= 1C + 2C + 3C
™tqC= 1C + 2C + 3C ™tqB
II. Then find shared rank for each category: (N is the total number of scores in the frequency table)
rq= ™tq – tq/2+0.5
III. Check shared ranks:
N (N+1)/2= ™ (tqr q)
IV. Find sample rank sums for each sample by multiplying the shared rank for each category by the
number of scores in that category and adding:
R1= (1A)(rqA)+(1B)(rqB)+(1C)(rqC)
R2= (2A)(rqA)+(2B)(rqB)+(2C)(rqC)
R3= (3A)(rqA)+(3B)(rqB)+(3C)(rqC)
V. Then check if ranking carried out correctly (the total sum of ranks should be equal N (N+1)/2):
N (N+1)/2= ™Rj
VI. Compute sample rank means: R
_
j= Rj/nj (n is the sample size)
VII. Compute and evaluate key statistics L and Z:
VIII. Finally, evaluate 2 by consulting table of normal distribution. For significance 2 must be equal or
greater than corresponding critical value.
Z=
L-E(L)
√ var (L) Where, and
E(L)=
1
(N+1)™nj Ïj
2 √ var(L)=
1
(N+1) (N™njÏj2-(™njÏj) (™njÏj)
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benefit of purchasing an unreliable car.
Furthermore, the fact that the same patterns of
diagnostic dyad selection were observed with
the extended preamble action problem suggests
that when subjects adopted the role of project
manager they also valued reliability over petrol
consumption. These interpretations are clearly
post hoc: we have no independent a priori
evidence concerning how our subjects weighted
attributes of cars such as petrol consumption
and mechanical reliability. A decision making
perspective on this Bayesian reasoning problem
however makes a number of interesting
predictions which future research may well
address. For one, if cost and benefit
considerations motivate the selection of some
attributes over others it ought to be possible to
create contrasting perspectives that encourage
different patterns of diagnostic dyad selection.
For example, some subjects may be invited to
adopt the role of a successful business
executive with unlimited petrol funds who needs
to be on the road a lot whereas others may be
invited to adopt the role of an experienced
mechanic who purchases a car for his cash-
strapped offspring for whom petrol consumption
may be more important. These different
perspectives may encourage different patterns
of data selection. 
If action problems foster more Bayesian
reasoning than inference problems simply
because they better emphasise the cost/benefit
topography of the choice behaviour, then it ought
to be possible to couch inference problems in
reasoning contexts which do so just as well.
Future researchers might well encounter or create
reasoning contexts whose underlying cost/benefit
structure encourages diagnostic information
selection, be the reasoning task framed as an
“action” or an “inference” problem. 
References
Beyth-Marom, R., & Fischhoff, B. (1983). Diagnosticity
and pseudodiagnosticity. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 45(6), 1185-1195. 
Doherty, M.E., Chadwick, R., Garavan, H, Barr D. &
Mynatt, C.R. (1996). On people’s understanding of
the diagnostic implications of probabilistic data.
Memory and Cognition, 24 (5), 644-654.
Doherty, M.E., Mynatt, C.R. & Tweney, R.D., (1979).
Pseudodiagnosticity. Acta Psychologica, 43, 111-121.
Everitt. B.S. (1977). The analysis of contingency tables.
London: Chapman and Hall.
Feeney, A., Evans, J.; Venn, S. (2008). Rarity,
pseudodiagnosticity and Bayesian reasoning.
Thinking & Reasoning, 14(3), 209 – 230.
Girotto, V., Evans, J.St.B.T., & Legrenzi, P. (1996). Relevance
of information and consideration of alternatives.
Pseudodiagnosticity as a focusing phenomenon. Paper
presented at the 3rd International Conference on
Thinking. University College London, August. 
Johnoson-Laird, P.N., Legrenzi, P., & Sonino-Legenzi, M.
(1972). Reasoning and a sense of reality. British
Journal of Psychology, 63, 395-400.
Legrenzi, P., Girotto, V. & Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1993).
Focussing in reasoning and decision-making.
Cognition, 49, 37-66.
Meddis, R. (1984). Statistics using Ranks: a unified
approach. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Mynatt, C.R., Doherty, M.E., & Dragan, W. (1993).
Information relevance, working memory and the
consideration of alternatives. Quarterly Journal of
Experimental Psychology, 46A, 759-778.
Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (1994). A national analysis
of the selection task as optimal data selection.
Psychological Review, 101(4), 608-631.
Popper, K.R. (1954). Degree of Confirmation. British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 5 (18): 143-149.
Selkirk, K.E. (1980). Chi~Squared & Contingency Tables.
UK: Nottingham University School of Education.
Wason, P.C. (1966) Reasoning. In B. Foss (ed.), New
Horizons in Psychology (pp. 135-51), London:
Penguin.
Wason, P.C. (1968) Reasoning about a rule. Quarterly
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 20, 273-81.
Diagnostic and pseudodiagnostic reasoning  35
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 24/12/2020 05:11:54 |
36   Markellos Tsioupras, Frédéric Vallée-Tourangeau and Panagiotis Kordoutis
¶·Ú¿ÁÔÓÙÂ˜ Ô˘ ÂËÚÂ¿˙Ô˘Ó ÙËÓ ÂÈÏÔÁ‹ ‰È·ÁÓˆÛÙÈÎÒÓ
Î·È „Â˘‰Ô‰È·ÁÓˆÛÙÈÎÒÓ ÏËÚÔÊÔÚÈÒÓ
MAPKE§§O™ T™IOY¶PA™1
FRÉDÉRIC VALLÉE-TOURANGEAU2
¶ANA°IøTH™ KOP¢OYTH™3
∏ ‰È·‰ÈÎ·Û›· ÙË˜ „Â˘‰Ô‡˜ ‰È¿ÁÓˆÛË˜ ·Ó·Ê¤ÚÂÙ·È ÛÙËÓ Ù¿ÛË ÙˆÓ ·ÓıÚÒˆÓ Ó·
ÚÔÙÈÌÔ‡Ó ÌË ¯Ú‹ÛÈÌÂ˜ ÏËÚÔÊÔÚ›Â˜ ·fi ÂÍ›ÛÔ˘ ‰È·ı¤ÛÈÌÂ˜ ÏËÚÔÊÔÚ›Â˜ ¯Ú‹-
ÛÈÌÂ˜ ÁÈ· ÙËÓ ÔÚı‹ ‰È¿ÁÓˆÛË. √È Mynatt, Doherty Î·È Dragan (1993) ·Ó¤ÊÂÚ·Ó
fiÙÈ Ë Û˘ÏÏÔÁÈÛÙÈÎ‹ ÙË˜ „Â˘‰Ô‰È¿ÁÓˆÛË˜ ÌÂÈÒÓÂÙ·È fiÙ·Ó ·ÊÔÚ¿ ÚÔ‚Ï‹Ì·Ù· ÛÙ· ÔÔ›· Ë ÂÈÏÔÁ‹ ÙˆÓ ÏË-
ÚÔÊÔÚÈÒÓ Â›¯Â Û˘Ó¤ÂÈÂ˜ ÁÈ· ÙË ÌÂÏÏÔÓÙÈÎ‹ ‰Ú¿ÛË ÙÔ˘ ·ÙfiÌÔ˘ ÛÂ ·ÓÙ›ıÂÛË ÌÂ Ù· ÚÔ‚Ï‹Ì·Ù· ÛÙ· ÔÔ›·
‰ÂÓ ¤¯ÂÈ Î¿ÔÈ· Û˘Ó¤ÂÈ·. √È Girotto, Evans & Legrenzi (1996) ·ÚÓ‹ıËÎ·Ó fiÙÈ Ù¤ÙÔÈ· ÚÔ‚Ï‹Ì·Ù· «‰Ú¿-
ÛË˜» ÂÓÈÛ¯‡Ô˘Ó ÙËÓ Î·Ï‡ÙÂÚË ÂÈÏÔÁ‹ ÙˆÓ ÏËÚÔÊÔÚÈÒÓ, ÂÂÈ‰‹ ˘ÔÛÙ‹ÚÈÍ·Ó fiÙÈ ÛÙË ÌÂÏ¤ÙË ÙˆÓ Mynatt
Î·È ÙˆÓ Û˘ÓÂÚÁ·ÙÒÓ ÙÔ˘ Ë ‰Ú¿ÛË Î·È Ë ÌË ‰Ú¿ÛË ‹ Ô Û˘ÌÂÚ·ÛÌfi˜ ‰È¤ÊÂÚÂ ·Ó¿ÏÔÁ· ÌÂ ÙÔ Ò˜ ‰È·Ù˘-
ÒıËÎÂ Ë ‰È·‰ÈÎ·Û›· ÙË˜ ·fiÊ·ÛË˜. ¶ÚÔ‚Ï¤ÊıËÎÂ fiÙÈ ÁÈ· Ù· ÚÔ‚Ï‹Ì·Ù· ‰Ú¿ÛË˜ ı· ˘¿Ú¯ÂÈ ÌÈ· ˘„Ë-
ÏfiÙÂÚË Û˘¯ÓfiÙËÙ· ÂÈÏÔÁ‹˜ Î·Ù·ÙÔÈÛÙÈÎÒÓ ‰Â‰ÔÌ¤ÓˆÓ ÛÂ ·ÓÙ›ıÂÛË ÌÂ fiÏ· Ù· ÚÔ‚Ï‹Ì·Ù· Û˘ÌÂÚ·-
ÛÌÔ‡. ∂ÈÚfiÛıÂÙ·, Ë Î˘ÚÈfiÙÂÚË Â›‰Ú·ÛË ÁÈ· Ù· ÚÔ‚Ï‹Ì·Ù· Û˘ÌÂÚ·ÛÌÔ‡ ı· Û˘Ì‚Â› ·ÓÂÍ¿ÚÙËÙ· ·fi
ÙË ÛÂÈÚ¿ ÙË˜ ·ÚÔ˘Û›·ÛË˜ ÙˆÓ ÏËÚÔÊÔÚÈÒÓ ·ÏÏ¿ fi¯È ÁÈ· Ù· ÚÔ‚Ï‹Ì·Ù· ‰Ú¿ÛË˜. ∂ÍÂÙ¿Û·ÌÂ ÙÔÓ ÙÚfi-
Ô ÌÂ ÙÔÓ ÔÔ›Ô ÔÈ ¿ÓıÚˆÔÈ Û˘ÏÏÔÁ›˙ÔÓÙ·È Û¯ÂÙÈÎ¿ ÌÂ Ù· ÚÔ‚Ï‹Ì·Ù· ‰Ú¿ÛË˜ Î·È Û˘ÌÂÚ·ÛÌÔ‡ Ï·Ì-
‚¿ÓÔÓÙ·˜ ˘fi„Ë ÙÈ˜ ÎÚÈÙÈÎ¤˜ ÙÔ˘ Girotto Î·È ÙˆÓ Û˘ÓÂÚÁ·ÙÒÓ ÙÔ˘. µÚ‹Î·ÌÂ fiÙÈ, ·ÎfiÌË Î·È fiÙ·Ó Ë ·-
ÚÔ˘Û›·ÛË Î·È Ë ÚÔ‚ÔÏ‹ ÙˆÓ ÏËÚÔÊÔÚÈÒÓ ÂÍÈÛÒÓÔÓÙ·È Î·È ÛÙ· ‰‡Ô Â›‰Ë ÙˆÓ ÚÔ‚ÏËÌ¿ÙˆÓ, Ë ÂÈÏÔÁ‹
ÙˆÓ ¯Ú‹ÛÈÌˆÓ ÁÈ· ÙË ‰È¿ÁÓˆÛË ÏËÚÔÊÔÚÈÒÓ ‹Ù·Ó ÈÔ Èı·Ó‹ ÁÈ· Ù· ÚÔ‚Ï‹Ì·Ù· ‰Ú¿ÛË˜ ·Ú¿ ÁÈ· Ù·
ÚÔ‚Ï‹Ì·Ù· Û˘ÌÂÚ·ÛÌÔ‡.
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